How (not) to Build Identity-Based Encryption from Isogenies

Elif Özbay Gürler[1] and Patrick Struck[2]

[1] Technische Universität Darmstadt, Germany
elif.oezbay@tu-darmstadt.de
[2] Universität Konstanz, Germany
patrick.struck@uni-konstanz.de

Abstract. In this work we show obstacles when constructing identity-based encryption (IBE) from isogenies. We first give a modular description for IBEs, what we call a canonical IBE, that consists of two components: an identity key derivation scheme and a public-key encryption scheme. This allows us to investigate the identity key derivation scheme (where the obstacles are rooted in) in isolation. We present several approaches, showing that they can either not be realized—extracting the secret keys would require to solve the underlying hardness assumption—or result in IBE schemes that are insecure—users can use their secret keys to compute secret keys of other users. Finally, we identify properties for isogeny-based trapdoor functions that one would need in order to overcome the identified obstacles.

1 Introduction

Encryption is one of the fundamental concepts of cryptography. Historically, encryption required the two communicating parties—Alice and Bob—to have some preshared key ahead of time, so-called symmetric encryption. In their seminal paper, Diffie and Hellman [25] introduced the concept of asymmetric or public-key encryption, where Alice has a key-pair consisting of a secret key, only known to her, and a public key, known by everyone. Using Alice's public key, Bob can encrypt messages that only Alice, using her secret key, can decrypt. The advantage of public-key encryption is that Alice and Bob no longer need a preshared key in order to securely communicate. Nevertheless, public-key encryption comes with the challenge that Bob needs an *authentic* copy of Alice's public key—something that is typically achieved via a public-key infrastructure.

A few years after Diffie and Hellman, Shamir [56] introduced the concept of identity-based encryption (IBE). Here, the identity of a user, say, Alice's email

* We thank Luca De Feo for very helpful comments and for pointing out that every IBE scheme can be transformed into a canonical one. This work was funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) – SFB 1119 – 236615297, the German Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space (BMFTR) under the project QUDIS (16KIS2091), and the Hector Foundation II.

address, is used instead of a public key. While the concept of identity-based encryption was around for several years, the first efficient construction is due to Boneh and Franklin [10]. On a high-level, IBE relies on a trusted party holding a master key-pair (mpk, msk). Instead of using a public key of Alice, Bob can encrypt a message using the master public key mpk and Alice's identity id_A. When Alice joins the system—which might in fact take place after Bob has already encrypted messages under her identity—the trusted party will provide Alice with her secret key sk_{id_A} which it derives from its master secret key msk and Alice's identity id_A. The fact that Alice might join the system later, also reveals one of the main challenges for constructing IBE: the trusted party needs to be able to generate Alice's secret key *after* Bob computed her public key.[3]

Since the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme is not based on quantum-hard assumptions, it will no longer be secure once large-scale quantum computers exist. A general question is therefore to construct IBE from quantum-hard assumptions. Clearly, hash-based cryptography does not work as it is limited to signature schemes. Multivariate cryptography seems less appealing as secure constructions tend to be signature schemes while proposed encryption schemes are often broken[4]. There are IBE constructions from lattices such as the one by Gentry et al. [38], which have also explicit security proofs against quantum adversaries [61]. Regarding code-based IBE constructions, we are only aware of the construction by Gaborit et al. [34], though this one was broken soon after [24]. The only isogeny-based IBE scheme was proposed by Fouotsa and Marco [33], which was also quickly shown to be insecure[5].

Isogeny-based IBE schemes, in particular, are appealing for another reason. Recently, Boneh et al. [11] gave a lower bound for the length of Fiat-Shamir signatures based on group actions. Although many compact isogeny-based signature schemes that are not based on group actions exist [3, 5, 20, 23, 28, 50], the lower bound is restrictive. On the other hand, it is known that short signatures can be obtained from certain IBE schemes—as pointed out by Boneh and Franklin [10], and later treated formally in [19]. This transform can indeed be an alternative way of bypassing the aforementioned lower bound. Therefore, it remains an alluring open question whether secure IBE schemes can be constructed from isogenies.

[3] Strictly speaking, there is no explicit public key of Alice in this setting. Looking ahead, though, we show in this work that the existing IBE constructions can actually be viewed as those where Bob can generate Alice's public key before her secret key is generated.

[4] An early example is the Matsumoto-Imai scheme [45] which got broken by Patarin [53]. In the recent NIST standardization process [51], all multivariate public-key encryption schemes were broken at the beginning of the first round.

[5] As declared in `https://lauranemarco.github.io/research`. Last accessed: 13th January 2025.

1.1 Our Contribution

In this work, we explore different variants of constructing IBE from isogenies, showing several limitations yielding either insecure constructions or constructions that we cannot instantiate (yet). We focus on what we call a *canonical IBE* definition. This definition decomposes into a "normal" public-key encryption scheme and an identity key derivation (IKD) scheme. The latter is a primitive that we introduce—though it implicitly appears already in prior works—and captures the gist of IBE: enabling the trusted party to extract the secret key of a user. The extraction requires the master secret key, where the public keys are derived from the master public key and the identity of a user. We claim that all IBE schemes can be put in the canonical form.

We then focus on constructing IKD schemes from isogenies. For the underlying PKE scheme, we first investigate the setting where the secret key sk is an isogeny between two elliptic curves which form the public key pk. The challenge for the IKD scheme is then to extract that secret isogeny from the two elliptic curves that are generated publicly based on the identity id and the master public key mpk. We cover various variants, depending on how the public key elliptic curves are computed. Looking at `CSIDH` (or also `FESTA`, `M-SIDH`, etc.), for instance, the starting curve would be the same for all users while the end curve would be different for each user. Unfortunately, we show that all these variants suffer from problems. Several constructions—for which the trusted party can extract the secret keys of users—turn out to be insecure: a malicious user Eve can leverage its own secret key sk_E to compute an isogeny equivalent to the secret key sk_A of another user Alice, allowing her to decrypt messages encrypted under Alice's public key. For constructions which do not suffer from the aforementioned insecurities, the problem lies in the construction of the IKD scheme. Extracting a secret key of the user essentially requires the trusted party to solve the underlying hardness assumption. Although this seems attainable with a trapdoor information included in msk—which will have the necessary power to invert the public key curve generated with mpk to compute the secret isogeny—the current state of isogeny-based trapdoor functions falls behind what is required. In addition to the limitations of isogeny-based trapdoor functions, another potential building block, i.e., random sampling of *Supersingular Elliptic Curves of Unknown Endomorphism Rings* (SECUER), is also missing in the literature. We further discuss the setting where the secret key is the knowledge of the endomorphism ring of the public key curve—which suffers from similar problems, and also covers the problem of the IBE proposal in [33].

Our results hold for all prominent isogeny settings (`CSIDH`, `SQISign`, etc.) since the obstacles and insecurities are indifferent to the setting. We only make the restriction that the secret key is an isogeny or the endomorphism ring of a supersingular elliptic curve which is prevalent in all the settings to the best of our knowledge. In light of these limitations, we conclude with a potential construction that requires a stronger trapdoor function than existing constructions and a SECUER generator.

1.2 Related Work

The concept of identity-based encryption was introduced by Shamir [56]. The first efficient constructions were given in [10, 18]. Further constructions of IBE are given, e.g., in [1, 47].

The first lattice-based instantiation is due to Gentry et al. [38], followed by more lattice-based constructions [2, 14, 31, 42, 59, 60]. Ji et al. [40] give constructions based on NTRU lattices, as do Lu et al. [44] in concurrent work to ours. The first code-based IBE scheme was given in [34], which was based on the code-based signature scheme RankSign [35], but broken in [24]. Tree-based approaches for IBE schemes were given in [13, 26, 27].

Quantum-resistant identity-based signatures are given in [41, 54, 57].

2 Preliminaries

We now recall the necessary background for this work. We start with the preliminaries on isogenies, and then continue with the definition of IBE schemes.

Throughout this work, we will be denoting random sampling with $\leftarrow\!\!\$$, e.g., $x \leftarrow\!\!\$ X$ will be interpreted as sampling an element x from a set X. A negligible function will be denoted as $\mathrm{negl}(\lambda)$, and an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, with access to an oracle O, as $\mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}}$. Unless stated otherwise, all the algorithms take the security parameter λ as an implicit input. With double square brackets we will denote the boolean value of the statement, e.g., $[\![b = b']\!]$ is `true` (or 1) if and only if $b = b'$.

2.1 Isogeny-Based Cryptography

An elliptic curve E is an algebraic smooth curve defined by the equation $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$ over a field $\mathbb{K}$. We denote the points defined on an elliptic curve E as a set $E(\mathbb{K})$, which contains all the (x, y) pairs over $\mathbb{K}$ that satisfy the equation, along with a special point $\mathcal{O}_E$, called point at infinity. This point set forms a group where the point at infinity is the identity of the group operation. This operation is called *point addition* denoted with $+$, and induces *scalar multiplication*, i.e., repetitive additions of points, e.g., $[k]P$ means P added to itself k times.

We denote the m-torsion subgroup with $E[m]$, which is the set of points over $\bar{\mathbb{K}}$ that give $\mathcal{O}_E$ when multiplied by m. If this subgroup is generated by two points P and Q, we denote it as $E[m] = \langle P, Q\rangle$. For a field $\mathbb{K}$ with characteristic p, and a positive integer r, if $E[p^r](\mathbb{K})$ is isomorphic to $\{0\}$, then we call E *supersingular*; if it is isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z}/p^r\mathbb{Z}$, then we call it *ordinary*. In the remainder of this work, we will always refer to supersingular elliptic curves, even if we omit the word *supersingular*.

An *isogeny* φ is a non-constant rational map between two elliptic curves, i.e., $\varphi\colon E \to E'$, with the condition that $\varphi(\mathcal{O}_E) = \mathcal{O}_{E'}$. The *degree* of an isogeny φ is denoted with $\mathtt{deg}(\varphi)$, and a degree l isogeny is often referred as an l-isogeny. For an isogeny $\varphi\colon E \to E'$, we call the set of points $P \in E$ such that $\varphi(P) = \mathcal{O}_{E'}$,

the *kernel* of φ, i.e., $\texttt{ker}(\varphi)$. An isogeny is *separable* if and only if the cardinality of its kernel is equal to its degree. We are only interested in separable isogenies, as they are determined by their kernels up to isomorphism.

The fundamental hardness assumption in isogeny-based cryptography is the isogeny path problem defined below.

Problem 1 (l-Isogeny Path Problem) *Given a prime p, and two supersingular elliptic curves E and E' defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, compute an l-isogeny path for a prime $l \neq p$, i.e., a sequence of degree l isogenies, from E to E'.*

This problem is assumed to be hard, and has different variations [8, 37] which are in use of well-known isogeny-based schemes.

An isogeny $\varphi : E \to E$ is called an *endomorphism* of E. All endomorphisms defined on E constitute a ring called *endomorphism ring*, denoted $\texttt{End}(E)$, with the operations being pointwise addition and composition. Computing the endomorphism ring of a supersingular elliptic curve is a hard problem that underlies a few isogeny-based cryptographic protocols, for instance [23, 36]. Below we recall the definition of the problem.

Problem 2 (Endomorphism Ring Problem) *Given a prime p, and a supersingular elliptic curve E defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, compute four endomorphisms that generate the endomorphism ring $\texttt{End}(E)$ of E as a $\mathbb{Z}$-module.*

The endomorphism ring problem was thoroughly investigated in [46, 52]—where Page and Wesolowski [52] showed that the problem is easy given access to a special oracle that reponds with independent non-scalar endomorphisms. Moreover, the endomorphism ring problem is also shown to be equivalent to the isogeny path problem [30, 58].

We call the endomorphism ring of an elliptic curve *known* if it is efficiently computable, and *unknown* otherwise. Extending the nomenclature in [4], we will refer to *Supersingular Elliptic Curves of Unknown Endomorphism Ring* as SECUERs, and *Supersingular Elliptic Curves of Known Endomorphism Ring* as SECKERs.

It is often required in cryptographic protocols to generate supersingular elliptic curves, or hash into the supersingular isogeny graph on input a bit string. We now continue investigating such generators in the form of hash functions.

Random Supersingular Elliptic Curve Generation. We define supersingular elliptic curve generators in regard to the output being a SECUER, a SECKER, and a codomain of a random isogeny walk.

There is no efficient algorithm proposed in the literature that can efficiently generate SECUERs in the absence of a trusted party or a distributed protocol, as investigated in [4, 12, 43, 48]. Nevertheless, we give a definition to use in our constructions for a comprehensive analysis.

Definition 3. *Let $\mathcal{E}ll$ be the set of supersingular elliptic curves defined over a field $\mathbb{K}$. A* SECUER *generator is a function $\texttt{H}^{UE}_{\mathcal{E}ll} \colon \{0,1\}^n \to \mathcal{E}ll$ such that, there exists no polynomial-time algorithm which, given $E \leftarrow \texttt{H}^{UE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}(x)$ for uniformly chosen $x \in \{0,1\}^n$, computes $\texttt{End}(E)$ with probability more than negligible.*

There are efficient SECKER generator constructions as mentioned in [12,48]. On the other hand, they have a vulnerability, namely the isogeny problem becomes easy when the domain and codomain curves are SECKERs. Nevertheless, we describe them as follows.

Definition 4. *Let $\mathcal{E}ll$ be the set of supersingular elliptic curves defined over a field $\mathbb{K}$, and $\mathcal{E}nd = \{\mathtt{End}(E) \colon E \in \mathcal{E}ll\}$. A* SECKER *generator is a function $\mathtt{H}^{KE}_{\mathcal{E}ll} \colon \{0,1\}^n \to \mathcal{E}ll \times \mathcal{E}nd$ such that the output is a pair in the form $(E, \mathtt{End}(E))$ for an $E \in \mathcal{E}ll$.*

We often do not need the endomorphism ring explicitly, in which case we drop the second output, i.e., instead of $(E, \mathtt{End}(E)) \leftarrow \mathtt{H}^{\mathtt{KE}}_{\mathcal{E}ll}(x)$ we simply write $E \leftarrow \mathtt{H}^{\mathtt{KE}}_{\mathcal{E}ll}(x)$

One other way to generate random supersingular elliptic curves is to take a random walk on the isogeny graph, which was first observed by Pizer [55], and then found a use in cryptographic applications [17], i.e., `CGL` hash function. It can be formally described as follows.

Definition 5. *Let $\mathcal{E}ll$ be the set of supersingular elliptic curves defined over a field $\mathbb{K}$, and $\Phi_{E,D}$ be the set of all isogenies of degree[6] D starting from $E \in \mathcal{E}ll$. An* isogeny walk (CGL) *generator is an injective function $\mathtt{H}^{CGL}_{\mathcal{E}ll} : (E, x) \mapsto \varphi$ that on input a starting curve $E \in \mathcal{E}ll$, and a bit string $x \in \{0,1\}^n$, generates an isogeny walk $\varphi \in \Phi_{E,D}$ such that $\varphi : E \to E'$.*

The CGL generator can behave like a SECKER/SECUER generator depending on the domain curve E. If E has unknown endomorphism ring, then the codomain E' is conjecturally a SECUER. Similarly, if $\mathtt{End}(E)$ is known, then the codomain E' is again a SECKER, as $\mathtt{End}(E')$ is efficiently computable through the isogeny φ. However, this is not the case if the party that calls the CGL generator keeps the random walk secret, or if the walk is computed via a distributed protocol as described in [4]. Although we can treat the CGL generator as a SECUER in this case, there is a nuance here: the random walk can be a valuable information to the party that keeps it secret. This is especially relevant in an IBE construction since there exists a trusted party which can use the CGL as a SECUER and keep the random walk as a trapdoor. We will indeed investigate this approach in the following sections.

2.2 Identity-Based Encryption

Below we define identity-based encryption (IBE) schemes and its security.

Definition 6. *An identity-based encryption scheme consists of four efficient algorithms:*

$\mathtt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$**:** *The key generation takes as input a security parameter 1^λ and outputs a master key-pair consisting of a master secret key msk and a master public key mpk,*

[6] The degree is usually a power of a small prime.

$\texttt{Enc}(mpk, id, m)$**:** *The encryption algorithm takes as input a master public key* mpk*, an identity* id*, and a message* m*, and it outputs a ciphertext* c*,*

$\texttt{Ext}(msk, id)$ *: The extract algorithm takes as input a master secret key* msk *and an identity* id*, and outputs a secret key* sk_{id}*,*

$\texttt{Dec}(sk, c)$**:** *The decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key* sk *and a ciphertext* c*, and it outputs a message* m*,*

where, by the correctness *of the scheme, the following holds*

$$\texttt{Dec}(sk_{id}, \texttt{Enc}(mpk, id, m)) = m\,,$$

such that $(msk, mpk) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$*, and* $sk_{id} \leftarrow \texttt{Ext}(msk, id)$*.*

Similarly to PKE schemes, IND-CPA security is a standard security notion for IBE schemes, which ensures that an adversary learns nothing from the ciphertext, about the plaintext. The difference is that the adversary can choose the target identity under which one of the two messages is encrypted and can further obtain the secret keys from any identity *different* from the target identity. The IND-CPA security can be defined as follows.

Definition 7. *An IBE scheme* $\texttt{IBE} = (\texttt{KGen}, \texttt{Enc}, \texttt{Ext}, \texttt{Dec})$ *is* IND-CPA*-secure, if for any efficient adversary* $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_0, \mathcal{A}_1)$ *(where* $\mathcal{A}_0$ *and* $\mathcal{A}_1$ *are assumed to share state),*

$$\left|\Pr\left[\text{IND-CPA}^{\mathcal{A},\mathsf{O}}_{\texttt{IBE}}(1^\lambda) = 1\right] - \frac{1}{2}\right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $\text{IND-CPA}^{\mathcal{A},\mathsf{O}}_{\texttt{IBE}}(\lambda)$ *is the game defined in Fig. 1.*

$\text{IND-CPA}^{\mathcal{A},\mathsf{O}}_{\texttt{IBE}}(1^\lambda)$	$\mathsf{O}(id_i)$
$\mathcal{C} \leftarrow \emptyset$	$\mathcal{C} \leftarrow \mathcal{C} \cup \{id_i\}$
$(msk, mpk) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \texttt{IBE.KGen}(1^\lambda)$	$sk_{id_i} \leftarrow \texttt{IBE.Ext}(msk, id_i)$
$(id, m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0^{\mathsf{O}(\cdot)}(mpk)$	**return** sk_{id_i}
$b \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \{0,1\}$	
$c \leftarrow \texttt{IBE.Enc}(mpk, id, m_b)$	
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\mathsf{O}(\cdot)}(c)$	
if $id \in \mathcal{C}$ **then return** $\perp$	
return $[\![b = b']\!]$	

Fig. 1: Definition of IND-CPA security for IBE schemes.

We note that, in the remainder of this work, we will be only focusing on key recovery attacks against IBE schemes, which trivially breaks IND-CPA security.

3 Isogeny-based IBE: Pitfalls of a Seemingly Straightforward Approach

In this section, we present the potential ways of an isogeny-based IBE construction, along with the problems of each approach. First, in Section 3.1, we introduce the concept of *canonical IBE*—which relies on a PKE scheme as one of its underlying components, and additionally an *identity key derivation* (IKD), a primitive which we introduce. Section 3.2 and 3.3 discuss the problems of isogeny-based IKD constructions in two different settings; the former relies on Problem 1 where the secret key is an isogeny, and the latter relies on Problem 2 where the secret key is the knowledge of an endomorphism ring. Finally, Section 3.4 investigates the usage of trapdoor functions in IKD constructions. We defer the discussion on how to construct an IBE from isogenies—in light of our negative results in this section—to Appendix A.

3.1 Canonical Identity-Based Encryption

We now introduce a modular IBE definition, what we call a *canonical* IBE. What makes a difference here is that we isolate the key derivation operations—both for the keys of the trusted party, and the users—in a separate scheme, namely an IKD scheme. Below we first recall the definition of PKE schemes, followed by the definition of IKD schemes.

Definition 8. *A public-key encryption scheme (PKE) consists of three efficient algorithms:*

$\texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *The probabilistic key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a key-pair consisting of a secret key sk and a public key pk.*

$\texttt{Enc}(pk, m)$ *The probabilistic encryption algorithm takes as input a public key pk and a message m, and it outputs a ciphertext c.*

$\texttt{Dec}(sk, c)$ *The deterministic decryption algorithm takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, and it outputs a message m.*

Definition 9. *An identity key derivation (IKD) scheme consists of three efficient algorithms:*

$\texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *The probabilistic key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1^λ and outputs a master key-pair consisting of a master secret key msk and a master public key mpk.*

$\texttt{Ext-pk}(mpk, id)$ *The deterministic public key extraction algorithm takes as input a master public key mpk and an identity id, and outputs a public key pk_{id}.*

$\texttt{Ext-sk}(msk, id)$ *The deterministic secret key extraction algorithm takes as input a master secret key msk and an identity id, and outputs a secret key sk_{id}.*

We introduce the IKD as a component of canonical IBEs for the sake of modularity, and easier analysis of the isogeny-based constructions. In particular,

the security notions an IKD should satisfy—so that the canonical IBE is secure—is indeed an interesting question. However, it falls out of the scope of this work. Therefore, we will only mention its one-wayness, and compatibility with the PKE. The one-wayness is strictly necessary for the security against key-recovery attacks.

Definition 10. *Let* $\texttt{IKD} = (\texttt{KGen}, \texttt{Ext-pk}, \texttt{Ext-sk})$ *be an IKD scheme We call the* IKD one-way *if, for a master key-pair* $(msk, mpk) \leftarrow_{\$} \texttt{IKD.KGen}(1^\lambda)$*, given* mpk*,* id*, and* $pk \leftarrow_{\$} \texttt{IKD.Ext-pk}(mpk, id)$*, no polynomial-time adversary can find a* sk'*, such that* $sk' = sk \leftarrow_{\$} \texttt{IKD.Ext-sk}(msk, id)$*, with probability more than negligible.*

Our definition of an IKD scheme captures the concept of preimage sampleable function (PSF) defined by Gentry *et al.* [38]—a PSF can be used to instantiate the trapdoor mechanism of our IKD definition.[7]

Furthermore, we need *compatibility* of the IKD and PKE as defined below. This property ensures that key pairs generated by the IKD are distributed like key pairs from the PKE scheme and is necessary to ensure the functionality of the (canonical) IBE scheme.

Definition 11. *Let* $\texttt{IKD} = (\texttt{KGen}, \texttt{Ext-pk}, \texttt{Ext-sk})$ *be an IKD scheme, and* $\texttt{PKE} = (\texttt{KGen}, \texttt{Enc}, \texttt{Dec})$ *be a PKE scheme. We call* IKD *and* PKE compatible*, if for all* id*, the key pairs* $(sk, pk) \leftarrow_{\$} (\texttt{IKD.Ext-sk}(msk, id), \texttt{IKD.Ext-pk}(mpk, id))$ *are distributed identically to key pairs* $\texttt{PKE.KGen}(1^\lambda)$*, where* $(msk, mpk) \leftarrow_{\$} \texttt{IKD.KGen}(1^\lambda)$*. The first distribution is taken over the random coins used to generate the master key-pair.*

Now, incorporating the components, i.e., PKE and IKD, the definition of a canonical IBE scheme can be given as follows.

Definition 12. *Let* $\texttt{IKD} = (\texttt{KGen}, \texttt{Ext-pk}, \texttt{Ext-sk})$ *be an IKD scheme and* $\texttt{PKE} = (\texttt{KGen}, \texttt{Enc}, \texttt{Dec})$ *be a PKE scheme, such that* IKD *and* PKE *are compatible. If* IKD *has a superpolynomial set of public keys, then we call* $\texttt{IBE} = (\texttt{KGen}, \texttt{Enc}, \texttt{Ext}, \texttt{Dec})$ *a* canonical IBE *scheme, where*

$$
\begin{aligned}
\texttt{IBE.KGen}(1^\lambda) &\coloneqq \texttt{IKD.KGen}(1^\lambda) \\
\texttt{IBE.Enc}(mpk, id, m) &\coloneqq \texttt{PKE.Enc}(\texttt{IKD.Ext-pk}(mpk, id), m) \\
\texttt{IBE.Ext}(msk, id) &\coloneqq \texttt{IKD.Ext-sk}(msk, id) \\
\texttt{IBE.Dec}(sk, c) &\coloneqq \texttt{PKE.Dec}(sk, c).
\end{aligned}
$$

We notice that the canonical IBE definition obviously matches with most of the constructions in the literature: in particular, the pairing-based scheme by Boneh and Franklin [10]; the lattice-based scheme by Gentry, Peikert, and Vaikuntanathan [38]; the code-based scheme by Gaborit *et al.* [34]; and the isogeny-based scheme by Fouotsa and Marco [33]. At first glance, the tree-based constructions by Döttling and Garg [27], and by Brakerski *et al.* [13] appear

[7] Looking ahead, we discuss this at the end of the paper in Isogeny Construction 5.

to be non-canonical because they are not constructed from a PKE scheme—like the aforementioned IBE schemes—but rely on more advanced primitives. It turns out, however, that every IBE scheme can generically be transformed into a canonical one by properly constructing a PKE along with a compatible IKD scheme out of it. With this observation, the focus on canonical IBE schemes is not a restriction but simplifies the exposition as we can focus on the IKD scheme in the following. This definition is useful in several ways; it provides an abstraction, it is modular, and it helps us reflect the obstacles of isogeny-based IBE construction through only one component in isolation—as the inherent problem reveals itself in the construction of the IKD scheme.

In the next three sections, we present the potential ways of a canonical isogeny-based IBE construction, along with the challenges of each approach. The challenges will appear in two ways:

1. there will be an efficient key-recovery attack,
2. the construction will require the trusted party to solve the underlying hardness assumption, i.e., Problem 1 (Isogeny Problem) and Problem 2 (Endomorphism Ring Problem).

We note that, the challenges occur regardless of the isogeny setting (`SIDH`, `CSIDH`, `SQISign`, etc). The key-recovery attacks will make use of general techniques, and in all the settings, Problem 1 and Problem 2 are assumed to be hard.

To still be able to refer to the parameters of the PKE scheme, regardless of the setting, here we will define generic notations that will be used throughout this section. Assuming they align with the PKE scheme, we will denote the set of all supersingular elliptic curves as $\mathcal{E}ll$, the underlying prime as p, field as $\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{F}_{p^k}$ (for an unspecified degree k), the degree of the secret isogeny as D_{sk}, the set of all isogenies of degree D with domain E as $\Phi_{E,D}$.

3.2 Using Isogenies as Secret Keys

We now restrict ourselves to the prevalent structure where all elliptic curves are supersingular, the secret key is an isogeny, where the domain and codomain curves are included in the public key. This is the typical setup for isogeny-based key-exchange/encryption schemes, and we will not make any further restrictions regarding the PKE scheme to be used.

An isogeny-based IKD scheme involves two elliptic curves that are connected by a secret isogeny. Although the domain curve is usually fixed in the public parameter in most schemes, e.g., `SIDH` [39], `CSIDH` [15], and `SQISign` [23], we will not restrict ourselves in this sense, and put both curves in the public key. For the same reason, we will diverge from the common notation used in the literature where the domain and codomain curves are denoted E_0 and E_{pk} respectively. Throughout the text, the public domain and codomain curves of the user with identity id will be denoted as $E_{0,id}$, $E_{1,id}$, respectively. In some cases, the public key curves will happen to be fixed for all users, and we will denote this with id^*, e.g., E_{0,id^*}, and E_{1,id^*}. We will abuse notation by writing $E \in mpk$ to denote that elliptic curve E is part of the master public key mpk.

To cover all possible isogeny-based IKD constructions in a structured order, we will categorize the approaches with respect to the public curves being fixed or variable with respect to the identity. As subconstructions of these approaches, we will be investigating the ways the public curves can be generated. This can happen in 3 ways; via SECUER[8], SECKER, and CGL generators. A CGL generator can produce either a SECUER or a SECKER depending on the setting, but we opt to investigate it separately as it is the usual way of generating random curves.

Whether the endomorphism rings of the curves are known or not is crucial to be able to discuss the achievability of the constructions. Thus, we specify this information by using the superscripts; $\circ$, $\CIRCLE$, $\bullet$, when denoting the curves, for unknown, unspecified, and known endomorphism rings, respectively. By unspecified we mean, the endomorphism ring can be known or unknown, and we consider both cases at once.

The constructions will be illustrated with isogeny diagrams in the remainder of this work. There, public isogenies that are known to all users will be shown with a black, solid arrow. A secret isogeny will be represented with red, and densely dashed arrows. In some cases, we will also illustrate the attacks against the constructions. Some attacks will involve isogenies which are not public by default, but computable by the attacker. These computable isogenies will be shown with blue and loosely dashed arrows.

Approach 0: Fixed Domain and Codomain Curves. We start with a naive IKD construction to illustrate the pattern one can follow comprehensively. We fix the public key curves and obtain a clearly insecure setting; however, it emphasizes the inherent problem of fixed curves that will be clearer as we progress.

Isogeny Construction 0 ($\texttt{IKD}_0$) *The* `IKD` *can be described with the following algorithms:*

`KGen`(1^λ) *On input a security parameter, choose two curves* $E^{\CIRCLE}_{0,id^*}, E^{\CIRCLE}_{1,id^*} \in \mathcal{E}ll$*, and output the key-pair* (msk, mpk)*, such that* $E^{\CIRCLE}_{0,id^*}, E^{\CIRCLE}_{1,id^*} \in mpk$*.*

`Ext-pk`(mpk, id) *On input a master public key and an identity, output* $E^{\CIRCLE}_{0,id^*}$ *and* $E^{\CIRCLE}_{1,id^*}$*.*

`Ext-sk`(msk, id) *On input a master secret key and an identity, compute and output an isogeny* $\varphi_{sk} \colon E^{\CIRCLE}_{0,id^*} \to E^{\CIRCLE}_{1,id^*}$*.*

The construction is simply achievable, if `KGen` picks $E^{\CIRCLE}_{0,id^*}$ and φ_{sk} first to compute $E^{\CIRCLE}_{1,id^*}$, and puts φ_{sk} in msk. Therefore, `Ext-pk` simply outputs mpk, and the trusted party can extract the secret key which is already included in msk.

[8] There is no efficient SECUER generator construction in the literature. Nonetheless, we take them into account for the sake of future advancements.



Fig. 2: Illustration of the `Ext-pk` algorithm for $\texttt{IKD}_0$. Both curves are fixed by `Ext-pk`, so is the secret key isogeny.

Problem of Isogeny Construction 0. Trivially, the secret and public keys are the same for every user, i.e., every user can use its own secret key to decrypt messages sent to other users. We will call this type of attack an *insider attack* from now on. It is important to note that if the endomorphism rings are known, i.e., $E^{\bullet}_{0,id^*}$ and $E^{\bullet}_{1,id^*}$, then even a party who is not involved in the system can compute the secret keys of the users and decrypt messages sent to the users in the system. This is possible due to the Deuring correspondence, which provides an efficient method to compute the isogeny connecting two curves with known endomorphism rings. However, in any variation where at least one of the curves has an unknown endomorphism ring, an outsider, i.e., an adversary that is not part of the system and therefore does not get a secret key from the trusted party, cannot attack the scheme as it needs to solve Problem 1 to compute the secret key.

Approach 1: Fixed Domain Curve, Variable Codomain Curve. The next approach keeps only the domain of the secret key isogeny fixed and allows the codomain to change regarding the identity. This is the general setting for isogeny-based schemes, e.g., `SIDH`, `CSIDH`, and `SQISign`.

Isogeny Construction 1 ($\texttt{IKD}_1$) *The* `IKD` *can be described with the following algorithms:*

$\texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *On input a security parameter, choose a curve* $E^{\bullet}_{0,id^*} \in \mathcal{E}ll$*, and output the key-pair* (msk, mpk)*, such that* $E^{\bullet}_{0,id^*} \in mpk$*.*

$\texttt{Ext-pk}(mpk, id)$ *On input a master public key and an identity, output* $E^{\bullet}_{0,id^*}$ *and a random*[9] $E^{\bullet}_{1,id}$ *depending on id and mpk.*

$\texttt{Ext-sk}(msk, id)$ *On input a master secret key and an identity, compute and output an isogeny* $\varphi_{sk} \colon E^{\bullet}_{0,id^*} \to E^{\bullet}_{1,id}$*.*

There are 3 variations[10] of this construction depending on how `Ext-pk` generates the public key curve, i.e. with a SECUER, SECKER, or CGL generator. Efficient SECUER generator constructions in the literature require either a trusted party setup, or a distributed protocol. Although, IBE schemes involve a trusted party, the `Ext-pk` algorithm is a publicly available algorithm by definition, and

[9] Here and in the rest of the text, by "random", we mean deterministically computed by a random oracle. In particular, `Ext-pk` is deterministic in the sense that, for fixed *mpk* and *id*, it will produce the same output.

[10] The case of variable domain curve and fixed codomain curve is entirely symmetrical, which is why we do not consider it explicitly here.

should not require an interaction with the trusted party. For the same reason, `Ext-pk` cannot be a distributed protocol either. However, taking into account possible future advancements on this problem, we will assume the existence of efficient SECUER generators, without trusted party interactions or distributed protocols.

Now, we describe the construction with a SECUER generator.

Isogeny Construction 1.1 ($\texttt{IKD}_{1.1}$) *Let $\mathtt{H}^{\mathit{UE}}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$ be a SECUER generator. The* `IKD` *can be described with the following algorithms:*

$\texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *On input a security parameter, choose a curve $E^{\CIRCLEARROWLEFT}_{0,id^*} \in \mathcal{E}ll$, and output the key-pair (msk, mpk), such that $E^{\CIRCLEARROWLEFT}_{0,id^*} \in mpk$.*

$\texttt{Ext-pk}(mpk, id)$ *On input a master public key and an identity, output $E^{\CIRCLEARROWLEFT}_{0,id^*}$ and $E^{\circ}_{1,id} \leftarrow \mathtt{H}^{\mathit{UE}}_{\mathcal{E}ll}(mpk, id)$.*

$\texttt{Ext-sk}(msk, id)$ *On input a master secret key and an identity, compute and output an isogeny $\varphi_{sk} \colon E^{\CIRCLEARROWLEFT}_{0,id^*} \to E^{\circ}_{1,id}$.*



Fig. 3: Illustration of the `Ext-pk` algorithm of $\texttt{IKD}_{1.1}$. The domain curve is fixed by the `KGen` algorithm. The codomain curve has unknown endomorphism ring, and is random with respect to the identity id.

Problem of Isogeny Construction 1.1. Here, assuming $E^{\circ}_{1,id}$ is random, the task of `Ext-sk` algorithm is to find an isogeny between two given curves, where one has unknown endomorphism ring. This requires solving Problem 1, which is assumed to be hard. However, the information included in msk cannot be overlooked. Assume msk includes a trapdoor information that recovers φ_{sk}. If $\texttt{End}(E_{0,id^*})$ is known to the trusted party, then $\texttt{End}(E_{1,id})$ is also known via φ_{sk}, which contradicts with $E_{1,id}$ being a SECUER. Conversely, if $\texttt{End}(E_{0,id^*})$ is unknown to the trusted party, then the trapdoor information breaks Problem 1. There exists isogeny-based trapdoor functions that offer a similar functionality in a more restricted setting where the codomain curve does not fit in our SECUER definition but still provides security guarantees. We will investigate them in detail in Section 3.4, and explain why current isogeny trapdoors are not suitable for this task, and what can be done to overcome the difficulties. Delaying the discussion on trapdoors, we conclude that this construction is not possible to achieve.

The second approach is using a SECKER generator in the construction of `Ext-pk`. This approach is insecure for trivial reasons, yet worth mentioning to better illustrate the pattern.

Isogeny Construction 1.2 ($\texttt{IKD}_{1.2}$) *Let* $\texttt{H}^{KE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$ *be a SECKER generator. The* IKD *can be described with the following algorithms:*

$\texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *On input a security parameter, choose a curve* $E^{\bullet\circ}_{0,id^*} \in \mathcal{E}ll$*, and output the key-pair* (msk, mpk)*, such that* $E^{\bullet\circ}_{0,id^*} \in mpk$*.*

$\texttt{Ext-pk}(mpk, id)$ *On input a master public key and an identity, output* $E^{\bullet\circ}_{0,id^*}$ *and* $E^{\bullet}_{1,id} \leftarrow \texttt{H}^{KE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}(mpk, id)$*.*

$\texttt{Ext-sk}(msk, id)$ *On input a master secret key and an identity, compute and output an isogeny* $\varphi_{sk} \colon E^{\bullet\circ}_{0,id^*} \to E^{\bullet}_{1,id}$*.*

As the public key curve $E^{\bullet}_{1,id}$ has known endomorphism ring, the `Ext-sk` algorithm is achievable if $\mathrm{End}(E^{\bullet\circ}_{0,id^*}) \in msk$.



(a) The `Ext-pk` algorithm of $\texttt{IKD}_{1.2}$.

(b) The attack that reveals msk and/or the secret key of other parties via the computation of isogeny λ.

Fig. 4: Illustration of $\texttt{IKD}_{1.2}$ and the attack.

Problem of Isogeny Construction 1.2. The Deuring correspondence allowing the realization of `Ext-sk` also enables a trivial attack to the construction. Since all public key curves have known endomorphism rings, Bob can compute the isogeny λ connecting Alice's public key curve $E^{\bullet}_{1,id_A}$ to his public key curve $E^{\bullet}_{1,id_B}$. Then, once Bob learns his secret key isogeny φ_{pk_B}, the composition $\hat{\lambda} \circ \varphi_{sk_B}$ gives the secret key of Alice, as described in Fig. 4b. There is an even stronger attack leaking the msk. Bob can compute $\texttt{End}(E^{\bullet\circ}_{0,id^*})$ via Deuring correspondence with the knowledge of $\texttt{End}(E^{\bullet}_{1,id_B})$ and φ_{sk_B}.

Last but not least, $E^{\bullet\circ}_{1,id}$ can be generated via a CGL generator, i.e., $E^{\bullet\circ}_{1,id}$ would be the codomain of a random walk on the isogeny graph. This approach is achievable and being used in isogeny-based schemes, but the IKD construction, described below, suffers from an insider attack.

Isogeny Construction 1.3 ($\texttt{IKD}_{1.3}$) *Let* $\texttt{H}^{CGL}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$ *be a CGL generator. The* IKD *can be described with the following algorithms:*

$\texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *On input a security parameter, choose two curves* $E^{\blacklozenge}_{0,id^*}, E^{\blacklozenge}_1 \in \mathcal{E}ll$*, and output the key-pair* (msk, mpk)*, such that* $E^{\blacklozenge}_{0,id^*}, E^{\blacklozenge}_1 \in mpk$

$\texttt{Ext-pk}(mpk, id)$ *On input a master public key and an identity, compute an isogeny* $\varphi_{id} \leftarrow \mathtt{H}^{\mathcal{CGL}}_{\mathcal{E}ll}(E^{\blacklozenge}_1, mpk, id)$*, such that* $\varphi_{id} \colon E^{\blacklozenge}_1 \to E^{\blacklozenge}_{1,id}$*. Output* $E^{\blacklozenge}_{0,id^*}$ *and* $E^{\blacklozenge}_{1,id}$*.*

$\texttt{Ext-sk}(msk, id)$ *On input a master secret key and an identity, compute and output an isogeny* $\varphi_{sk} \colon E^{\blacklozenge}_{0,id^*} \to E^{\blacklozenge}_{1,id}$*.*



(a) The `Ext-pk` algorithm of $\texttt{IKD}_{1.3}$.

(b) The attack that reveals the secret key of other parties via the computation of isogeny λ.

Fig. 5: Illustration of $\texttt{IKD}_{1.3}$ and the attack.

To include the information of an isogeny $\lambda \colon E^{\blacklozenge}_{0,id^*} \to E^{\blacklozenge}_1$ in msk would easily allow trusted party to extract the secret keys. But as before, the problem appears as an insider attack.

Problem of the Isogeny Construction 1.3. In this construction, Bob, who enrolls with the system and learns his secret key φ_{sk_B} is able to find the isogeny $\lambda \colon E^{\blacklozenge}_{0,id^*} \to E^{\blacklozenge}_1$ through the composition $\hat{\varphi}_{id_B} \circ \varphi_{sk_B}$. With the knowledge of λ and publicly computable φ_{id_A}, he can compute the isogeny $\varphi'_{sk_A} = \varphi_{id_A} \circ \lambda$, as described in Fig. 5. This isogeny is not necessarily the secret key φ_{sk_A} of Alice, as we do not specify how the trusted party computes the secret key of Alice. Therefore, we need to make a case distinction to further analyze.

Now, consider two cases: (1) at least one of the endomorphism rings is known (2) none of the endomorphism rings are known. In the first case, any user can compute all the other endomorphism rings due to the known connections, which falls into the previous case in Construction 1.2. In the second case, the only way the trusted party can extract secret keys is via the knowledge of λ. Otherwise, i.e.,

$\varphi_{sk_A} \neq \varphi'_{sk_A}$, the trusted party could compute non-trivial[11] endomorphisms in the form $\hat{\varphi}_{sk_A} \circ \varphi'_{sk_A}$. Polynomially-many independent endomorphisms suffice to compute the whole endomorphism ring, which contradicts with the assumption that the trusted party does not know any endomorphim rings. Thus, either $\varphi_{sk_A} = \varphi_{id_A} \circ \lambda$, such that any party can compute $\lambda \in msk$, or the construction is insecure for the same reasoning as in Construction 1.2.

It is important to note that the random walks in CGL generators cannot be hidden to the one who generates, i.e., the users in the system. This would be possible in a setting where the `Ext-pk` algorithm involves an interaction with the trusted party. However, this is not the case in the definition of IBEs.

Therefore, Isogeny Construction 1, is either not possible to achieve or insecure. The construction appears to be impossible when the variable curve $E^{\bullet}_{1,id}$ that changes depending on the identity, is sampled via a SECUER generator. When $E^{\bullet}_{1,id}$ is sampled via a SECKER generator, the dangers of known endomorphism rings emerge inevitably. The plausible and straightforward approach is to sample $E^{\bullet}_{1,id}$ via a CGL generator; however this requires another fixed curve, $E^{\bullet}_{1}$ in Fig. 5, in the scheme. Similar to the situation in Approach 0, the existence of two fixed curves enables an attack, as the isogeny between them gets revealed unavoidably.

Approach 2: Variable Domain and Codomain Curves. To circumvent the pitfalls of fixed curves, we take the natural next step and make the domain curve of the secret key variable as well.

Isogeny Construction 2 ($\texttt{IKD}_2$) *The* `IKD` *can be described with the following algorithms:*

`KGen`(1^λ) *On input a security parameter, output a key-pair* (msk, mpk).
`Ext-pk`(mpk, id) *On input a master public key and an identity, output a random pair* $(E^{\bullet}_{0,id}, E^{\bullet}_{1,id})$ *depending on id and mpk.*
`Ext-sk`(msk, id) *On input a master secret key and an identity, compute and output an isogeny* $\varphi_{sk} \colon E^{\bullet}_{0,id} \to E^{\bullet}_{1,id}$.

Similar to Isogeny Construction 1, the random public key curves can be generated via a SECUER, SECKER, or CGL generator. This propagates to 6 variations[12]. We divide the variations into 2 categories, and investigate the variants within these categories as one, since the complications are either the same or alike.

We start with the first three variations, where at least one of the public key curves has unknown endomorphism ring. This results in the impossibility of achieving `Ext-sk`.

[11] More specifically, non-scalar endomorphisms. In the `CSIDH` setting, however, the ones that are in the subring of a quadratic imaginary field $\mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{-D})$ are also considered trivial.

[12] As in Approach 1, we ignore the symmetric versions.

Isogeny Construction 2.1 ($\texttt{IKD}_{2.1}$) *Let* $\texttt{H}^{UE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$, $\texttt{H}^{KE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$, *and* $\texttt{H}^{CGL}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$ *be a SECUER generator, a SECKER generator, and a CGL generator, respectively. The* IKD *can be described with the following algorithms:*

$\texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *On input a security parameter, output a key-pair* (msk, mpk).

$\texttt{Ext-pk}(mpk, id)$ *On input a master public key and an identity, output a random pair* $(E^{\circ}_{0,id}, E^{\textcolor{black}{\LEFTcircle}}_{1,id})$ *depending on id and mpk, where* $E^{\circ}_{0,id}$ *is generated via* $\texttt{H}^{UE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$, *and* $E^{\textcolor{black}{\LEFTcircle}}_{1,id}$ *is generated via* $\texttt{H}^{UE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$, $\texttt{H}^{KE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$, *or* $\texttt{H}^{CGL}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$. *If* $E^{\textcolor{black}{\LEFTcircle}}_{1,id}$ *is generated via* $\texttt{H}^{CGL}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$, *we assume there exists* $E^{\textcolor{black}{\LEFTcircle}}_1 \in mpk$ *s.t.* $\varphi_{id} \leftarrow \texttt{H}^{CGL}_{\mathcal{E}ll}(E^{\textcolor{black}{\LEFTcircle}}_1)$.

$\texttt{Ext-sk}(msk, id)$ *On input a master secret key and an identity, compute and output an isogeny* $\varphi_{sk} \colon E^{\circ}_{0,id} \to E^{\textcolor{black}{\LEFTcircle}}_{1,id}$.



Fig. 6: Illustrations of the variations of $\texttt{IKD}_{2.1}$, which are impossible.

Problem of Isogeny Construction 2.1. Similar to Isogeny Construction 1.1, one of the curves, i.e. $E^{\circ}_{0,id}$ have an unknown endomorphism ring, and the Ext-sk algorithm needs to find an isogeny between this curve and some other random curve. This is again hard, due to Problem 1. Once more we postpone the discussion to Section 3.4 on the prospect of msk containing a trapdoor information that will ease this task. Besides that, we conclude all 3 variations of Isogeny Construction 2.1, as seen in Fig. 6, are not possible to achieve.

The other 3 variations include only the SECKER and CGL generators. This time, the constructions are all achievable but insecure. We wrap up the remaining in the following description, and continue with the attacks to the constructions.

Isogeny Construction 2.2 ($\texttt{IKD}_{2.2}$) *Let* $\texttt{H}^{KE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$ *be a SECKER generator, and* $\texttt{H}^{CGL}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$ *be a CGL generator. The* IKD *can be described with the following algorithms:*

$\texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *On input a security parameter, output a key-pair* (msk, mpk).

$\texttt{Ext-pk}(mpk, id)$ *On input a master public key and an identity, output a random pair* $(E^{\textcolor{black}{\LEFTcircle}}_{0,id}, E^{\textcolor{black}{\LEFTcircle}}_{1,id})$ *depending on the id and mpk, where the curves are either generated via* $\texttt{H}^{KE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$ *or* $\texttt{H}^{CGL}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$.

$\texttt{Ext-sk}(msk, id)$ *On input a master secret key and an identity, compute and output an isogeny* $\varphi_{sk} \colon E^{\textcolor{black}{\LEFTcircle}}_{0,id} \to E^{\textcolor{black}{\LEFTcircle}}_{1,id}$.

(a) Anyone can compute φ_{sk} as the endomorphism rings of both domain and codomain are known.



(b) One can compute λ_0 via the known endomorphism rings, and λ_1 via public random walks. Bob can learn $\varphi_{sk_A} = \hat{\lambda}_1 \circ \varphi_{sk_B} \circ \lambda_0$.



(c) Both λ_0 and λ_1 can be computed as the random walks are public. Bob can learn $\varphi_{sk_A} = \hat{\lambda}_1 \circ \varphi_{sk_B} \circ \lambda_0$.

Fig. 7: Illustrations of the variations of `Ext-pk` algorithms of $\texttt{IKD}_{2.2}$, and the attacks to $\texttt{IKD}_{2.2}$.

Problem of Isogeny Construction 2.2. The complications of using SECKER and CGL generators appear once again in the remaining variations of the construction. When both domain and codomain have known endomorphism rings, as can be seen in Fig. 7a, an outsider attack exists which reveals φ_{sk} via the known endomorphism rings. In the variation shown in Fig. 7b, only the domain curves have known endomorphism rings, and codomain curves are generated via random walks from $E_1^{\bullet\circ}$. The isogeny λ_0 can be computed with the information of known endomorphism rings of the domain curves. Moreover, the isogeny λ_1 is also computable as a composition of the random walks shown with black arrows. Therefore, Bob as a party in the system, can compute $\varphi_{sk}{}'_A = \hat{\lambda}_1 \circ \varphi_{sk_B} \circ \lambda_0$. As in Construction 1.3, this isogeny is not necessarily the secret key of Alice, and a case distinction is required depending on whether the endomorphism rings of the codomain curves are known: If the endomorphism rings are known, then any party can compute all the endomorphism rings, resulting in the same setup as in Fig. 7a; Assuming the endomorphism rings are unknown, again leads to a contradiction. In the last variation shown in Fig. 7c, both domain and codomain curves are generated via random walks from $E_0^{\bullet\circ}$ and $E_1^{\bullet\circ}$, respectively. This enables the same attack as before, the mere difference is that Bob computes λ_0 differently. Namely, also as the composition of the random walks. Thus, all vari-

ations of Isogeny Construction 2.2 are insecure, where the first one suffers from an outsider attack while the other two suffer from an insider attack.

Approach 3: Larger Public Keys. To further broaden our scope, we discuss whether having larger public (and secret) keys helps circumvent the obstacles. We argue that increasing the number of curves in the user's public keys—therefore having multiple secret isogenies in the secret keys—does not mitigate the attacks. The public random walks, starting from a fixed curve in mpk, will nevertheless reveal all the secret isogenies to the other users, as before. However, it is reasonable to consider having multiple fixed curves in mpk to separate the public random walks. A similar structure can be seen in the signature schemes [9,22]. This approach would require a different curve in the master public key for each user—otherwise our attacks are still applicable, though restricted to users that share the same curve from the master public key. In this sense, the number of curves in the master public key scales with the number of users which would render it impractical. On top of that, the number of users would need to be fixed in advance when generating the master key-pair.

3.3 Using Endomorphism Rings as Secret Keys

Computing the endomorphism ring of a supersingular elliptic curve, i.e., Problem 2, is at heart of the security of several isogeny-based primitives, e.g., `SQISign` digital signature scheme [23] and its variants [6,20,23,49]. Therefore, the setting where the secret key is the knowledge of the endomorphism ring of the public key curve cannot be ignored when building an isogeny-based scheme. As proven by Page and Wesolowski [52], the endomorphism ring problem reduces to the one endomorphism problem, i.e., one can compute the whole endomorphism ring given access to an oracle OneEnd that repsonds with independent non-scalar endomorphisms on the curve. Benefiting from this result, when we talk about the security of the IKD construction, we will investigate whether the adversary can build this oracle—that implies it can compute the whole endomorphism ring which is the secret key.[13]

As before, the security of such construction boils down to how the public key curve is generated. Assuming the public key curve is sampled via a SECUER generator, the trusted party is required to solve Problem 2 to extract the secret key—which hinders the realization of the `Ext-sk` algorithm. Further, we immediately discard the option of using a SECKER generator as it contradicts the fact that the endomorphism ring is the secret, and should be unknown to other parties. Using a CGL generator seems to be the plausible approach; and in fact, it is what underlies the isogeny-based IBE scheme proposed by Fouotsa and Marco [33]. Unfortunately, the construction suffers from an attack which caused

[13] It is slightly easier to build this oracle in the `CSIDH` setting where the Frobenius endomorphism always exists. Nevertheless, we will present the generic attacks without using any setting-specific information.

the proposal to be retracted afterwards. The construction, as we abstract via the IKD definition, is as follows.

Isogeny Construction 3 ($\texttt{IKD}_3$) *Let $\texttt{H}^{CGL}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$ be a CGL generator. The* IKD *can be described with the following algorithms:*

$\texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *On input a security parameter, output a key-pair (msk, mpk).*

$\texttt{Ext-pk}(mpk, id)$ *On input a master public key and an identity, output a random curve E°_{id} depending on the id and mpk, where the curve is generated via $\texttt{H}^{CGL}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$.*

$\texttt{Ext-sk}(msk, id)$ *On input a master secret key and an identity, compute and output the endomorphism ring $\texttt{End}(E^\circ_{id})$.*



Fig. 8: Illustration of $\texttt{IKD}_3$ and the attack.

Problem of Isogeny Construction 3. The attack is a combination of the generalized lollipop attack [16] and the reductions given in [52]. As can be seen in Fig. 8, the public isogenies φ_{id_A} and φ_{id_B} allow one to compute the connecting isogeny $\lambda : E_{1,id_A} \to E_{1,id_B}$. Then, once Alice learns her secret endomorphism ring $\texttt{End}(E^\circ_{id})$, she can build the oracle OneEnd as follows: She samples an endomorphism θ_A, computes the endomorphism $\lambda \circ \theta_A \circ \hat{\lambda} = \theta_B \in \texttt{End}(E^\circ_{1,id_B})$. Alice then can compute the whole endomorphism ring $\texttt{End}(E^\circ_{1,id_B})$ using this oracle, and thus learn the secret key of Bob.

Thus, we conclude that the endomorphism ring approach similarly fails to give a secure IKD construction.

3.4 Trapdoors

In all constructions where the Ext-sk algorithm is needed to solve the underlying hardness assumption, it is only natural to ask if we can empower the trusted party with extra information. This information included in msk can allow the trusted party to solve the assumed to be hard problem. Especially since the Ext-pk algorithm that generates the public curves, takes mpk as input. This means the trusted party can make use of a trapdoor function family, so that the

public key curves generated under mpk can be inverted via msk to compute the secret isogeny/endomorphism.

To the best of our knowledge, FESTA [7] and SILBE [29] are the only isogeny-based trapdoor functions proposed in the literature.[14] Now, we recall FESTA, and discuss the construction of IKD via trapdoor functions with it.

Definition 13 (FESTA). *Let E_0 be a supersingular elliptic curve defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ for a prime p. Define $\langle P_b, Q_b \rangle = E_0[2^b]$ to be a fixed torsion basis, d_A, d_1, and d_2 be predefined degrees. The* FESTA *trapdoor function family* $\texttt{FESTA}(\texttt{KGen}, f, f^{-1})$ *can be described with the following algorithms:*

$\texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *On input a security parameter, set $pp = (E_0, p, P_b, Q_b, d_A, d_1, d_2)$. Choose an isogeny $\varphi_A \colon E_0 \to E_A$ of degree d_A, and an invertible diagonal matrix A. Compute the scaled image points $\begin{pmatrix} R_A \\ S_A \end{pmatrix} = A \begin{pmatrix} \varphi_A(P_b) \\ \varphi_A(Q_b) \end{pmatrix}$. Output $(sk, pk) = ((A, \varphi_A), (pp, E_A, R_A, S_A))$.*

$f(1^\lambda, pk, x)$ *On input a security parameter, a public key pk, and an input x, parse $pk = (pp, E_A, R_A, S_A)$, and $x = (\langle K_1 \rangle, \langle K_2 \rangle, B)$. Compute two isogenies $\varphi_1 \colon E_0 \to E_1$ and $\varphi_2 \colon E_A \to E_2$ with kernels $\langle K_1 \rangle, \langle K_2 \rangle$ and of degree d_1 and d_2 respectively. Compute $\begin{pmatrix} R_1 \\ S_1 \end{pmatrix} = B \begin{pmatrix} \varphi_1(P_b) \\ \varphi_1(Q_b) \end{pmatrix}$ and $\begin{pmatrix} R_2 \\ S_2 \end{pmatrix} = B \begin{pmatrix} \varphi_2(R_A) \\ \varphi_2(S_A) \end{pmatrix}$. Output $y = (E_1, R_1, S_1, E_2, R_2, S_2)$.*

$f^{-1}(1^\lambda, pk, sk, y)$ *On input a security parameter, a public key pk, a secret key sk, and an output y, parse $pk = (pp, E_A, R_A, S_A)$, $sk = (A, \varphi_A)$, and $y = (E_1, R_1, S_1, E_2, R_2, S_2)$. Compute the isogeny $\psi \colon \varphi_2 \circ \varphi_A \circ \hat{\varphi}_1 \colon E_1 \to E_2$ via an* SIDH *attack. Recover the kernels $\langle K_1 \rangle, \langle K_2 \rangle$ of the isogenies φ_1, φ_2 respectively, and the matrix B. Output $x = (\langle K_1 \rangle, \langle K_2 \rangle, B)$.*

It is crucial here to note that the inversion function f^{-1} is only guaranteed to invert valid output generated by f. This means, the trapdoor information (A, φ_A) is not enough by itself, to recover a secret isogeny connecting random public key curves [21]. In fact, this is a property of *preimage sampleable trapdoor functions* as defined in the lattice-based IBE paper [38]. In other words, for a uniformly chosen y, there exists an x such that $f(x) = y$, and the inversion function can efficiently find it via $f^{-1}(y) = x$. Since both FESTA and SILBE do not have this arbitrary output inversion property, it is not possible to randomly generate the public key curves, and extract the secret isogeny connecting them. Therefore, the only possible way is to generate the public key curves via the function f.

Isogeny Construction 4 ($\texttt{IKD}_4$) *Let the parameters be the same as in the description of* FESTA*. The* IKD *can be described with the following algorithms:*

$\texttt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *On input a security parameter 1^λ, compute*

$$(A_{msk}, \varphi_{msk}), (pp, E_{mpk}, R_{mpk}, S_{mpk}) \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \texttt{FESTA.KGen}(1^\lambda)\,.$$

[14] Although the abbreviations FESTA and SILBE stand for the encryption schemes, we refer to the underlying trapdoor function for sake of conciseness.

Let $\mathtt{H}$ *be a random oracle that on input an id, outputs* $(\langle K_1\rangle, \langle K_2\rangle, B)$*, where* $\langle K_1\rangle, \langle K_2\rangle$ *are cyclic subgroups of* $E_0[d_1]$ *and* $E_{mpk}[d_2]$*, and* B *is an invertible diagonal matrix. Let* $(A_{msk}, \varphi_{msk}) \in msk$*, and* $(pp, E_{mpk}, R_{mpk}, S_{mpk}, \mathtt{H}) \in mpk$*, and output the key pair* (msk, mpk)*.*

$\mathtt{Ext\text{-}pk}(mpk, id)$ *On input a master public key and an identity, output a public key* $pk = (E_{0,id}, R_{0,id}, S_{0,id}, E_{1,id}, R_{1,id}, S_{1,id}) \leftarrow f(1^\lambda, mpk, \mathtt{H}(id))$*.*

$\mathtt{Ext\text{-}sk}(msk, id)$ *On input a master secret key and an identity, compute* $pk \leftarrow f(1^\lambda, mpk, \mathtt{H}(id))$*. Invert the public key* $(\langle K_1\rangle, \langle K_2\rangle, B) \leftarrow f^{-1}(1^\lambda, mpk, msk, pk)$*. Recover and output* $\varphi_{sk}\colon E_{0,id} \to E_{1,id}$ *from the information of* msk *and* $(\langle K_1\rangle, \langle K_2\rangle, B)$*.*



Fig. 9: Illustration of $\mathtt{IKD}_4$ and the attack that reveals the master secret key φ_{msk}.

Problem of Isogeny Construction 4. There is an insider attack to the scheme, as shown in Fig. 9, that works in the following way. Once Alice learns her secret isogeny φ_{sk_A}, she can compute the composition $\varphi_{msk} = \hat{\varphi}_{1,id_A} \circ \varphi_{sk_A} \circ \varphi_{0,id_A}$. This partially reveals msk. Then, she can compute Bob's secret key via $\varphi_{sk_B} = \varphi_{1,id_B} \circ \varphi_{msk} \circ \hat{\varphi}_{0,id_B}$.

The instruments that enable the attack are reciprocal; either the fact that f runs a $\mathtt{CGL}$ generator revealing an isogeny path to the msk curves, or that f^{-1} cannot revert uniformly sampled outputs. The attack similarly applies when $\mathtt{SILBE}$ trapdoor function is used in place of $\mathtt{FESTA}$, due to the same reasons.

4 How to Build IBE from Isogenies

It is apparent that the achievable constructions are insecure due to the vulnerabilities stemming from SECKER and CGL generators. On the other hand, when only SECUER generators are used, the trusted party is required to solve the underlying hardness assumption. Therefore, one needs a trapdoor function family—that provides the trusted party with the trapdoor information to solve the underlying hardness assumption. Admitting the difficulty of efficient SECUER generator instantiation, we claim it is still insufficient for an IBE construction, as we also require such trapdoor mechanism that we describe in Appendix A.

References

1. Amit Agarwal, Rex Fernando, and Benny Pinkas. Efficiently-thresholdizable batched identity based encryption, with applications. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2024/1575, 2024. (Cited on page 4.)
2. Shweta Agrawal, Dan Boneh, and Xavier Boyen. Efficient lattice (H)IBE in the standard model. In Henri Gilbert, editor, *EUROCRYPT 2010*, volume 6110 of *LNCS*, pages 553–572. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, May / June 2010. (Cited on page 4.)
3. Andrea Basso, Giacomo Borin, Wouter Castryck, Maria Corte-Real Santos, Riccardo Invernizzi, Antonin Leroux, Luciano Maino, Frederik Vercauteren, and Benjamin Wesolowski. PRISM: Simple and compact identification and signatures from large prime degree isogenies. In Tibor Jager and Jiaxin Pan, editors, *PKC 2025, Part III*, volume 15676 of *LNCS*, pages 300–332. Springer, Cham, May 2025. (Cited on page 2.)
4. Andrea Basso, Giulio Codogni, Deirdre Connolly, Luca De Feo, Tako Boris Fouotsa, Guido Maria Lido, Travis Morrison, Lorenz Panny, Sikhar Patranabis, and Benjamin Wesolowski. Supersingular curves you can trust. In Carmit Hazay and Martijn Stam, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2023, Part II*, volume 14005 of *LNCS*, pages 405–437. Springer, Cham, April 2023. (Cited on pages 5 and 6.)
5. Andrea Basso, Pierrick Dartois, Luca De Feo, Antonin Leroux, Luciano Maino, Giacomo Pope, Damien Robert, and Benjamin Wesolowski. SQIsign2D-West - the fast, the small, and the safer. In Kai-Min Chung and Yu Sasaki, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2024, Part III*, volume 15486 of *LNCS*, pages 339–370. Springer, Singapore, December 2024. (Cited on page 2.)
6. Andrea Basso, Luca De Feo, Pierrick Dartois, Antonin Leroux, Luciano Maino, Giacomo Pope, Damien Robert, and Benjamin Wesolowski. SQIsign2D-West: The fast, the small, and the safer. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2024/760, 2024. (Cited on page 19.)
7. Andrea Basso, Luciano Maino, and Giacomo Pope. FESTA: Fast encryption from supersingular torsion attacks. In Jian Guo and Ron Steinfeld, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2023, Part VII*, volume 14444 of *LNCS*, pages 98–126. Springer, Singapore, December 2023. (Cited on page 21.)
8. Ward Beullens, Luca De Feo, Steven D. Galbraith, and Christophe Petit. Proving knowledge of isogenies: a survey. *DCC*, 91(11):3425–3456, 2023. (Cited on page 5.)
9. Ward Beullens, Thorsten Kleinjung, and Frederik Vercauteren. CSI-FiSh: Efficient isogeny based signatures through class group computations. In Steven D. Galbraith and Shiho Moriai, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2019, Part I*, volume 11921 of *LNCS*, pages 227–247. Springer, Cham, December 2019. (Cited on page 19.)
10. Dan Boneh and Matthew K. Franklin. Identity-based encryption from the Weil pairing. In Joe Kilian, editor, *CRYPTO 2001*, volume 2139 of *LNCS*, pages 213–229. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, August 2001. (Cited on pages 2, 4, and 9.)
11. Dan Boneh, Jiaxin Guan, and Mark Zhandry. A lower bound on the length of signatures based on group actions and generic isogenies. In Carmit Hazay and Martijn Stam, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2023, Part V*, volume 14008 of *LNCS*, pages 507–531. Springer, Cham, April 2023. (Cited on page 2.)
12. Jeremy Booher, Ross Bowden, Javad Doliskani, Tako Boris Fouotsa, Steven D. Galbraith, Sabrina Kunzweiler, Simon-Philipp Merz, Christophe Petit, Benjamin Smith, Katherine E. Stange, Yan Bo Ti, Christelle Vincent, José Felipe Voloch, Charlotte Weitkämper, and Lukas Zobernig. Failing to hash into supersingular

isogeny graphs. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2022/518, 2022. (Cited on pages 5 and 6.)
13. Zvika Brakerski, Alex Lombardi, Gil Segev, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Anonymous IBE, leakage resilience and circular security from new assumptions. In Jesper Buus Nielsen and Vincent Rijmen, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2018, Part I*, volume 10820 of *LNCS*, pages 535–564. Springer, Cham, April / May 2018. (Cited on pages 4 and 9.)
14. David Cash, Dennis Hofheinz, Eike Kiltz, and Chris Peikert. Bonsai trees, or how to delegate a lattice basis. In Henri Gilbert, editor, *EUROCRYPT 2010*, volume 6110 of *LNCS*, pages 523–552. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, May / June 2010. (Cited on page 4.)
15. Wouter Castryck, Tanja Lange, Chloe Martindale, Lorenz Panny, and Joost Renes. CSIDH: An efficient post-quantum commutative group action. In Thomas Peyrin and Steven Galbraith, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2018, Part III*, volume 11274 of *LNCS*, pages 395–427. Springer, Cham, December 2018. (Cited on page 10.)
16. Wouter Castryck and Frederik Vercauteren. A polynomial time attack on instances of M-SIDH and FESTA. In Jian Guo and Ron Steinfeld, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2023, Part VII*, volume 14444 of *LNCS*, pages 127–156. Springer, Singapore, December 2023. (Cited on page 20.)
17. Denis Xavier Charles, Kristin E. Lauter, and Eyal Z. Goren. Cryptographic hash functions from expander graphs. *Journal of Cryptology*, 22(1):93–113, January 2009. (Cited on page 6.)
18. Clifford Cocks. An identity based encryption scheme based on quadratic residues. In Bahram Honary, editor, *8th IMA International Conference on Cryptography and Coding*, volume 2260 of *LNCS*, pages 360–363. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, December 2001. (Cited on page 4.)
19. Yang Cui, Eiichiro Fujisaki, Goichiro Hanaoka, Hideki Imai, and Rui Zhang. Formal security treatments for signatures from identity-based encryption. In Willy Susilo, Joseph K. Liu, and Yi Mu, editors, *ProvSec 2007*, volume 4784 of *LNCS*, pages 218–227. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, November 2007. (Cited on page 2.)
20. Pierrick Dartois, Antonin Leroux, Damien Robert, and Benjamin Wesolowski. SQIsignHD: New dimensions in cryptography. In Marc Joye and Gregor Leander, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2024, Part I*, volume 14651 of *LNCS*, pages 3–32. Springer, Cham, May 2024. (Cited on pages 2 and 19.)
21. Luca De Feo, Tako Boris Fouotsa, and Lorenz Panny. Isogeny problems with level structure. In Marc Joye and Gregor Leander, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2024, Part VII*, volume 14657 of *LNCS*, pages 181–204. Springer, Cham, May 2024. (Cited on page 21.)
22. Luca De Feo and Steven D. Galbraith. SeaSign: Compact isogeny signatures from class group actions. In Yuval Ishai and Vincent Rijmen, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2019, Part III*, volume 11478 of *LNCS*, pages 759–789. Springer, Cham, May 2019. (Cited on page 19.)
23. Luca De Feo, David Kohel, Antonin Leroux, Christophe Petit, and Benjamin Wesolowski. SQISign: Compact post-quantum signatures from quaternions and isogenies. In Shiho Moriai and Huaxiong Wang, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2020, Part I*, volume 12491 of *LNCS*, pages 64–93. Springer, Cham, December 2020. (Cited on pages 2, 5, 10, and 19.)
24. Thomas Debris-Alazard and Jean-Pierre Tillich. Two attacks on rank metric code-based schemes: RankSign and an IBE scheme. In Thomas Peyrin and Steven Galbraith, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2018, Part I*, volume 11272 of *LNCS*, pages 62–92. Springer, Cham, December 2018. (Cited on pages 2 and 4.)

25. Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography. *IEEE Transactions on Information Theory*, 22(6):644–654, 1976. (Cited on page 1.)
26. Nico Döttling and Sanjam Garg. From selective IBE to full IBE and selective HIBE. In Yael Kalai and Leonid Reyzin, editors, *TCC 2017, Part I*, volume 10677 of *LNCS*, pages 372–408. Springer, Cham, November 2017. (Cited on page 4.)
27. Nico Döttling and Sanjam Garg. Identity-based encryption from the Diffie-Hellman assumption. In Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham, editors, *CRYPTO 2017, Part I*, volume 10401 of *LNCS*, pages 537–569. Springer, Cham, August 2017. (Cited on pages 4 and 9.)
28. Max Duparc and Tako Boris Fouotsa. SQIPrime: A dimension 2 variant of SQISignHD with non-smooth challenge isogenies. In Kai-Min Chung and Yu Sasaki, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2024, Part III*, volume 15486 of *LNCS*, pages 396–429. Springer, Singapore, December 2024. (Cited on page 2.)
29. Max Duparc, Tako Boris Fouotsa, and Serge Vaudenay. SILBE: An updatable public key encryption scheme from lollipop attacks. In Maria Eichlseder and Sébastien Gambs, editors, *SAC 2024, Part I*, volume 15516 of *LNCS*, pages 151–177. Springer, Cham, August 2024. (Cited on page 21.)
30. Kirsten Eisenträger, Sean Hallgren, Kristin E. Lauter, Travis Morrison, and Christophe Petit. Supersingular isogeny graphs and endomorphism rings: Reductions and solutions. In Jesper Buus Nielsen and Vincent Rijmen, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2018, Part III*, volume 10822 of *LNCS*, pages 329–368. Springer, Cham, April / May 2018. (Cited on page 5.)
31. Keita Emura, Shuichi Katsumata, and Yohei Watanabe. Identity-based encryption with security against the KGC: A formal model and its instantiation from lattices. In Kazue Sako, Steve Schneider, and Peter Y. A. Ryan, editors, *ESORICS 2019, Part II*, volume 11736 of *LNCS*, pages 113–133. Springer, Cham, September 2019. (Cited on page 4.)
32. Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In Andrew M. Odlyzko, editor, *CRYPTO'86*, volume 263 of *LNCS*, pages 186–194. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, August 1987.

NOT CITED

33. Tako Boris Fouotsa and Laurane Marco. Towards identity based encryption from M-SIDH and the SIDH attacks. Presented at Leuven Isogeny Days 4, Leuven Belgium, 2023. Last accessed: 13th January 2025. (Cited on pages 2, 3, 9, and 19.)
34. Philippe Gaborit, Adrien Hauteville, Duong Hieu Phan, and Jean-Pierre Tillich. Identity-based encryption from codes with rank metric. In Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham, editors, *CRYPTO 2017, Part III*, volume 10403 of *LNCS*, pages 194–224. Springer, Cham, August 2017. (Cited on pages 2, 4, and 9.)
35. Philippe Gaborit, Olivier Ruatta, Julien Schrek, and Gilles Zémor. RankSign: An efficient signature algorithm based on the rank metric. In Michele Mosca, editor, *Post-Quantum Cryptography - 6th International Workshop, PQCrypto 2014*, pages 88–107. Springer, Cham, October 2014. (Cited on page 4.)
36. Steven D. Galbraith, Christophe Petit, and Javier Silva. Identification protocols and signature schemes based on supersingular isogeny problems. In Tsuyoshi Takagi and Thomas Peyrin, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2017, Part I*, volume 10624 of *LNCS*, pages 3–33. Springer, Cham, December 2017. (Cited on page 5.)
37. Steven D. Galbraith and Frederik Vercauteren. Computational problems in supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2017/774, 2017. (Cited on page 5.)

38. Craig Gentry, Chris Peikert, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Trapdoors for hard lattices and new cryptographic constructions. In Richard E. Ladner and Cynthia Dwork, editors, *40th ACM STOC*, pages 197–206. ACM Press, May 2008. (Cited on pages 2, 4, 9, 21, and 28.)
39. David Jao and Luca De Feo. Towards quantum-resistant cryptosystems from supersingular elliptic curve isogenies. In Bo-Yin Yang, editor, *Post-Quantum Cryptography - 4th International Workshop, PQCrypto 2011*, pages 19–34. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, November / December 2011. (Cited on page 10.)
40. Weidan Ji, Zhedong Wang, Haoxiang Jin, Qi Wang, Geng Wang, and Dawu Gu. Identity-based encryption from lattices with more compactness in the standard model. In Maria Eichlseder and Sébastien Gambs, editors, *SAC 2024, Part I*, volume 15516 of *LNCS*, pages 259–281. Springer, Cham, August 2024. (Cited on page 4.)
41. Yan Jiang, Youwen Zhu, Jian Wang, and Yudi Zhang. Efficient online and non-interactive threshold signatures with identifiable aborts for identity-based signatures in the IEEE P1363 standard. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2024/1333, 2024. (Cited on page 4.)
42. Shuichi Katsumata and Shota Yamada. Partitioning via non-linear polynomial functions: More compact IBEs from ideal lattices and bilinear maps. In Jung Hee Cheon and Tsuyoshi Takagi, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2016, Part II*, volume 10032 of *LNCS*, pages 682–712. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, December 2016. (Cited on page 4.)
43. Jonathan Love and Dan Boneh. Supersingular curves with small non-integer endomorphisms, 2020. (Cited on page 5.)
44. Xingye Lu, Jingjing Fan, and Man Ho AU. Relaxed lattice-based programmable hash functions: New efficient adaptively secure IBEs. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2024/1535, 2024. (Cited on page 4.)
45. Tsutomu Matsumoto and Hideki Imai. Public quadratic polynominal-tuples for efficient signature-verification and message-encryption. In C. G. Günther, editor, *EUROCRYPT'88*, volume 330 of *LNCS*, pages 419–453. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, May 1988. (Cited on page 2.)
46. Arthur Herlédan Le Merdy and Benjamin Wesolowski. The supersingular endomorphism ring problem given one endomorphism. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2023/1448, 2023. (Cited on page 5.)
47. Aikaterini Mitrokotsa, Sayantan Mukherjee, and Jenit Tomy. Oblivious identity-based encryption - (IBE secure against an adversarial KGC). In Maria Eichlseder and Sébastien Gambs, editors, *SAC 2024, Part I*, volume 15516 of *LNCS*, pages 282–309. Springer, Cham, August 2024. (Cited on page 4.)
48. Marzio Mula, Nadir Murru, and Federico Pintore. Random sampling of supersingular elliptic curves. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2022/528, 2022. (Cited on pages 5 and 6.)
49. Kohei Nakagawa and Hiroshi Onuki. SQIsign2D-East: A new signature scheme using 2-dimensional isogenies. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2024/771, 2024. (Cited on page 19.)
50. Kohei Nakagawa, Hiroshi Onuki, Wouter Castryck, Mingjie Chen, Riccardo Invernizzi, Gioella Lorenzon, and Frederik Vercauteren. SQIsign2D-East: A new signature scheme using 2-dimensional isogenies. In Kai-Min Chung and Yu Sasaki, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2024, Part III*, volume 15486 of *LNCS*, pages 272–303. Springer, Singapore, December 2024. (Cited on page 2.)

51. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Call for additional digital signature schemes for the post-quantum cryptography standardization process. https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/pqc-dig-sig/documents/call-for-proposals-dig-sig-sept-2022.pdf, 2022. (Cited on page 2.)
52. Aurel Page and Benjamin Wesolowski. The supersingular endomorphism ring and one endomorphism problems are equivalent. In Marc Joye and Gregor Leander, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2024, Part VI*, volume 14656 of *LNCS*, pages 388–417. Springer, Cham, May 2024. (Cited on pages 5, 19, and 20.)
53. Jacques Patarin. Cryptanalysis of the Matsumoto and Imai public key scheme of eurocrypt'88. In Don Coppersmith, editor, *CRYPTO'95*, volume 963 of *LNCS*, pages 248–261. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, August 1995. (Cited on page 2.)
54. Cong Peng, Jianhua Chen, Lu Zhou, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo, and Debiao He. Csiibs: A post-quantum identity-based signature scheme based on isogenies. *Journal of Information Security and Applications*, 54:102504, 2020. (Cited on page 4.)
55. Arnold K. Pizer. Ramanujan graphs and hecke operators. *Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society*, 23:127–137, 1990. (Cited on page 6.)
56. Adi Shamir. Identity-based cryptosystems and signature schemes. In G. R. Blakley and David Chaum, editors, *CRYPTO'84*, volume 196 of *LNCS*, pages 47–53. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, August 1984. (Cited on pages 1 and 4.)
57. Surbhi Shaw and Ratna Dutta. Post-quantum secure identity-based signature achieving forward secrecy. *Journal of Information Security and Applications*, 69:103275, 2022. (Cited on page 4.)
58. Benjamin Wesolowski. The supersingular isogeny path and endomorphism ring problems are equivalent. In *62nd FOCS*, pages 1100–1111. IEEE Computer Society Press, February 2022. (Cited on page 5.)
59. Shota Yamada. Adaptively secure identity-based encryption from lattices with asymptotically shorter public parameters. In Marc Fischlin and Jean-Sébastien Coron, editors, *EUROCRYPT 2016, Part II*, volume 9666 of *LNCS*, pages 32–62. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, May 2016. (Cited on page 4.)
60. Shota Yamada. Asymptotically compact adaptively secure lattice IBEs and verifiable random functions via generalized partitioning techniques. In Jonathan Katz and Hovav Shacham, editors, *CRYPTO 2017, Part III*, volume 10403 of *LNCS*, pages 161–193. Springer, Cham, August 2017. (Cited on page 4.)
61. Mark Zhandry. Secure identity-based encryption in the quantum random oracle model. In Reihaneh Safavi-Naini and Ran Canetti, editors, *CRYPTO 2012*, volume 7417 of *LNCS*, pages 758–775. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, August 2012. (Cited on page 2.)

A SECUER Trapdoors

To pinpoint what exactly is required for a secure isogeny-based IBE construction, we give the description of a strong primitive—as we call, a SECUER trapdoor function family.

Definition 14. *Let* $\mathtt{H}^{UE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}$ *be a SECUER generator. The SECUER trapdoor function family* $\Sigma = (\mathtt{KGen}, f, f^{-1})$ *consists of the following algorithms:*

$\mathtt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *On input a security parameter, output a key-pair* (pk, sk).

$f(pk, x)$ *On input* pk *and* x*, output* $E_x \leftarrow\!\!\$\ \mathtt{H}^{UE}_{\mathcal{E}ll}(pk, x)$.
$f^{-1}(sk, E_x)$ *On input* sk *and* E_x*, output* $\mathtt{End}(E_x)$.

This trapdoor function family is the analogue of preimage sampleable function families defined in [38]. The SECUER generator samples an element from the range of function f, and f^{-1} achieves to find its preimage. Nevertheless, we use the term SECUER to point out that it is strictly necessary for such construction to work.

We now give the description for an IKD construction that would work under the assumption that there exists an efficient SECUER trapdoor function instantiation.

Isogeny Construction 5 ($\mathtt{IKD}_5$) *Let* $\Sigma = (\mathtt{KGen}, f, f^{-1})$ *be a SECUER trapdoor function family. The* IKD *can be described with the following algorithms:*

$\mathtt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$ *On input a security parameter, output a master key-pair* $(msk, mpk) \leftarrow \Sigma.\mathtt{KGen}(1^\lambda)$.

$\mathtt{Ext\text{-}pk}(mpk, id)$ *On input a master public key and an identity, output* $E_{id} \leftarrow f(mpk, id)$.

$\mathtt{Ext\text{-}sk}(msk, id)$ *On input a master secret key and an identity, compute and output a secret key* $\mathtt{End}(E_{id}) \leftarrow f^{-1}(msk, E_{id})$.

Since the public key curves are generated via a SECUER generator, the attacks that stem from the usage of SECKER and CGL generators no longer remain. Moreover, notice that due to the reductions between Problem 1 and Problem 2, the secret endomorphism ring $\mathtt{End}(E_{id})$ can be replaced with a secret isogeny $\varphi_{id} : E_0 \to E_{id}$, where $E_0 \in mpk$ is a supersingular elliptic curve with unknown endomorphism ring included in. Meaning, the instantiation of SECUER trapdoor function family implies an IBE scheme in both settings we discussed, i.e., secret key being either an isogeny or an endomorphism ring.